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The Mexico-United States border is one of the world's largest drug smuggling 
corridors.  Seventy percent of all cocaine, up to 80 percent of all marijuana and 30 
percent of the heroin entering the United States comes from Mexico.  Especially after the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, increased resources have been directed at deterring and 
preventing illegal aliens, drug smugglers, potential terrorists, and other criminals from 
entering the United States illegally.  The case we study in this thesis especially addresses 
a signal entry, e.g. a one-time well-planned smuggling of a weapon of mass destruction. 
There are official entry points along the border where migrants can enter legally.  
The USBP’s primary mission is to detect and prevent the entry of unauthorized aliens 
into the country, assist in the detection of possible terrorists, and interdict drug smugglers 
and other criminals between official points of entry. 
Today, about 90 percent of the USBP agents are stationed at the southwest border. 
Between 1997 and 2004, 97 percent of the apprehensions due to illegal migration were 
made along the 1,952 mile-long southwest border.  The USBP divides the southwest 
border into nine operational sectors, which encompass 80 percent of the illegal migrant 
traffic.  
The main strategy employed by the USBP is “prevention through deterrence”. 
This strategy recommends that the Border Patrol try to prevent illegal alien entry rather 
than catch illegal aliens after they enter the country.  However, the USBP employs 
checkpoints on highways, and air patrols over border areas for both interdiction and 
humanitarian purposes.  
In 1994, the U.S. Attorney General proposed a five-part strategy to secure the 
border.  This strategy calls for allocating additional Border Patrol resources first in the 
areas of highest known illegal activity.  This strategy of strengthening the border at some 
relatively easy-to-infiltrate areas will push infiltration to other areas that are harder to 
exploit, and thus will make it harder for the infiltrators to traverse through the rough  
 xviii
features of the deserts, mountains and rugged terrain.  However, this approach is not 
necessarily optimal.  Although operationally intuitive approaches have great value, 
optimization can provide insights for planning purposes.  
We discuss a worst-case scenario of infiltration through the border.  Optimally 
allocating border patrol assets to candidate locations, we evaluate the probability of 
detecting an infiltrator and also the probability of catching an infiltrator given that 
detection occurs.  We assume independence between probability of detection by different 
search assets, and detections on consecutive hops along the infiltrator’s path.  We assume 
that the infiltrator can see the USBP’s preparations and act accordingly to maximize his 
probability of escape.  Minimizing this maximum probability reveals a USBP action plan 
for the worst-case scenario where the infiltrator follows the minimum-risk path.  
We solve a sample problem of border patrol interdiction problem for the U.S. – 
Mexican border near Yuma, Arizona.  Yuma sector is one of the nine sectors along the 
southwest border.  Yuma sector has stations in both Arizona, and California.  We 
examine only the area of responsibility of border patrol stations in Arizona portion of 
Yuma sector.  We develop a two-sided model to minimize the maximum achievable 




This thesis develops an optimization model to allocate border patrol activities to 
interdict unauthorized entry, maximizing the probability of catching an infiltrator by 
using available assets subject to budget or availability constraints.  We accomplish this 
through a network representation of a sample border area.  This thesis develops a border 
patrol interdiction problem for the U.S.-Mexican border near Yuma, Arizona; the object 
is a generic model that could be applied to any border area.  
A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION  
Illegal immigration and its consequences are a problem for many countries around 
the world, including the U.S.  Unauthorized entry by aliens brings problems such as 
drugs, smuggling, increased crime rates and threat of infiltration by terrorists.  For 
example, The Mexico-United States border is the world's largest drug smuggling 
corridor.  70 percent of all cocaine and up to 80 percent of all marijuana and 30 percent 
of the heroin entering the United States comes from Mexico [General Accounting Office 
(GAO) 1994].  Especially after the September 11 terrorist attacks, increased resources 
have been directed at deterring and preventing illegal aliens, drug smugglers, potential 
terrorists, and other criminals from entering the United States illegally [GAO 2004, p. 5]. 
The population of illegal immigrants living in the U.S. is between 9.2-10 million, based 
on current population surveys collected by the Census Bureau, according to the Center 
for Immigration Studies [Camarota 2004, p. 5]. 
The 1,952 mile Southwest U.S. border has long been the flash point for 
illegal immigration into the United States: over the last seven years 97% 
of all illegal alien apprehensions have been made along the southwest 
border.  The United States Border Patrol (USBP) divides the southwest 
border into nine operational sectors, two in California, two in Arizona, and 
five in Texas (Figure 1).  Today, about 90% of USBP agents are deployed 
along the southwest border.  Majority of them is concentrated in those 
nine corridors that encompass over 80% of the illegal migrant traffic 
[Nuñez-Neto 2004, p. 12].  
There is a distinction made between “at entry points” and “between entry points.” 
USBP has no agents at the entry points.  
The USBP’s primary mission is to detect and prevent the entry of 
unauthorized aliens into the country, assist in the detection of possible 
terrorists, and interdict drug smugglers and other criminals between 
official points of entry.  USBP agents have no official role at points of 
entry; instead, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspectors stationed 
there are responsible for conducting immigrations, customs, and 
agricultural inspections on entering aliens. [GAO 2004, p. 5] 
 
Figure 1.   Nine Border Patrol Sectors [From: GAO 1997, p. 6]. 
 
B. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION  
Office of National Drug Control Policy recommends that the Border Patrol try to 
prevent illegal alien entry rather than catch illegal aliens after they enter the country 
[GAO 1994, p. 3].   
In 1994, the U.S. Attorney General proposed a five-part strategy to strengthen the 
nation’s borders.  This strategy calls for the Border Patrol to: 
(1) allocate additional Border Patrol resources first with the areas of 
highest known illegal activity; (2) make maximum use of physical 
barriers; (3) increase the proportion of time Border Patrol agents spend on 
border enforcement activities; and (4) identify the appropriate mix of 
technology, equipment, and personnel needed for the Border Patrol. [GAO 
1997, p. 1]  
2 
3 
“The strategy to strengthen the border calls for prevention through deterrence; 
that is, to raise the risk of being apprehended for illegal aliens to a point where they will 
consider it futile to try to enter the United States illegally” [GAO 1997, p. 11]. 
This strategy can be regarded as greedy. Strengthening the border at some 
relatively easy-to-infiltrate areas (highly inhabited, relatively easier terrain) will shift 
infiltration to other areas that are harder to exploit, and thus will make it easier to detect 
those who traverse through the features of the deserts, mountains and rough terrain.  It 
will be easier because those areas are much less populated.  The strategy calling for 
allocating additional resources first to the areas of highest known illegal activity is not 
necessarily optimal, however.  
A study by the University of Houston’s Center for Immigration Research shows 
that the overall number of illegal alien deaths on the U.S. – Mexico border has not 
increased, but there has been an increase in the number of deaths in the remote areas 
where illegal immigrants have traveled in an effort to avoid areas of greater enforcement 
along the border [GAO 1997, p. 51]. This border patrol plan is not necessarily inefficient, 
but we would like to optimize the border strength all along the border line, using 
available resources subject to some constraints suggested by the budget available. 
Another consideration in border security and drug interdiction is that the 
infiltrators are adaptive: the infiltrator can see what the interdictor does, and thus can 
optimize infiltration with this prior knowledge, e.g. find clever ways to make it to the 
other side of the border minimizing the probability of being detected or apprehended. 
This is, in fact, what is seen by border patrollers.  This is acknowledged by Alan D. 
Bersin, attorney general's special representative for the southwest border issues, U.S. 
Department of Justice:  
In 1994, when we began to review deployment and strategy, we started 
with this region, believing it was vital to deal first with our most difficult 
problems.  We have had notable success.  The immediate effect of 
Gatekeeper was to alter dramatically the entry pattern of undocumented 
aliens and force them into a much more inhospitable and rugged terrain. 
We then had to deploy agents to the new area of entry, while not 
neglecting to keep our reinforcements in Imperial County.  One of the 
lessons we have learned from studying past strategies is that it is not 
sufficient to make progress in one area and then move on.  The smugglers 
4 
simply return to their old ways.  What made the original route so popular 
e.g., ready access to highways and the opportunity quickly to reach big 
cities, will again be a draw.  Therefore, we cannot simply move agents 
wholesale from California to Texas in order to deal with the problems in 
Texas.  Instead, we have to reassess strategically and carefully manpower 
needs so that we do not backslide in one area as we work to handle 
another” [House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Immigration and 
Claims, Committee on the Judiciary (HOR) 1997, p. 121]. 
Traffickers are shipping smaller amounts and varying their smuggling 
patterns and routes to minimize their losses.  Not only have  major drug 
organizations and independents changed some of their trafficking patterns; 
they have also modified their methods of communication, methods of 
concealment and the operation of their distribution networks to thwart law 
enforcement efforts [HOR 1997, p. 145].  
Infiltrators learn from experience, and from open sources, where the Border Patrol 
uses its assets, and avoid being detected by changing their patterns accordingly.  
There are several types of operations and activities that the USBP employs to 
interdict illegal entrants: 
1. Operations and Activities in General 
a. Road Patrols 
Improved and semi-improved roads within a station’s area of operations 
are patrolled regularly.  
b. Off-Road Operations 
Those operations are conducted by the USBP in addition to road patrols. 
c. Sensors 
These are small seismic or magnetic transmitters that are capable of 
detecting movement on the ground.  When a sensor is activated, a signal, indicating the 
information when and where the sensor was activated, is sent to the nearest station.  A 
patrol agent team is then sent to the area to search for the infiltrators.  
d. Air Operations (Heli-Patrol) 
Yuma sector’s air operations are located at the U.S. Marine Corps Air 
Station.  Air operations are primarily used in deterrence and search and rescue missions. 
Helicopters fly at altitudes visible to the infiltrators, and that is supposed to deter them. 
There are generalized flight routes within the sector.  Deviations from those 
predetermined flight routes are only made to follow the tracks of persons or vehicles that 
5 
are known to have made an illegal entry into the U.S. [Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) 2002, p. 1-12]. 
e. Fences and Barriers 
Fences are typically constructed in urban areas, and around official Ports-
of-Entry.  Fences are 10-15 feet-high.  They are usually built within six feet of the border. 
USBP cannot protect the southern part of the fence, which makes it easier to be breached 
[INS 2002, p. 1-15].  We will exclude fencing as an option in USBP activities, because it 
is not a major component of the deterrence system, even though it is used largely along 
the border. 
f. Permanent and Portable Lighting 
These are permanent stadium type lights on 30-foot poles, or portable 
diesel powered lights.  To be most effective, lighting should be used along with other 
assets [INS 2002, p. 1-17].  We will regard lighting as a contributor to probability of 
detection as it serves as part of the infrastructure, not as an operation or activity itself.  
2. Operations and Activities in Yuma Sector 
This sector (Figure 2) consists of Yuma, La Paz, and Mojave counties in Arizona; 
Riverside, San Bernardino, and Imperial counties in California; and Lincoln, Nye and 
White Pine counties in Nevada.  However, we will just study the portions of the sector in 
Arizona (hereafter, we will address those portions in Arizona as the Yuma sector).  There 
are two USBP stations in Yuma: Yuma and Wellton.  The agents in Yuma station patrol 
118 miles of the Mexican border.  Table 1 shows activities within the Yuma station as of 
2002 [INS 2002, p. 2-19]. 
a. Yuma Station  
Existing infrastructure as of 2002 is shown in Table 1 and Figure 3 (All 
satellite images in this thesis are retrieved from the KEYHOLE software from 
www.keyhole.com). 
b. Wellton Station:  
This station has responsibility for 64 miles of the border.  In addition to 
the activities and assets shown in Table 1, this station has an air-surveillance area.  Daily 
2.5-hour-long flights are made [INS 2002, p. 2-19] (Figures 4 and 5). 
     STATITION 
ACTIVITY YUMA WELLTON
Miles of Patrol Roads 500 150 
Number of Ground Sensors 214 47 
Number of Agents 240 51 
Number of Remote Video Surveillance Sites 16 0 
Miles of landing mat fence 6.3 0 
Air patrols YES YES 
Off Road Patrols YES YES 
Checkpoint 1PERMANENT 1TEMPORARY 1 
  



































C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Wood [1993] introduces a deterministic network interdiction model that considers 
an adversary seeking to maximize flow through a capacitated network while an 
interdictor tries to minimize this maximum flow by interdicting arcs using available 
resources.  
Cormican, Morton and Wood [1996] introduce a stochastic maximum-flow 
network interdiction model that has applications to interdicting drug smuggling and to 
reducing the effectiveness of an enemy’s movement of troops, materiel, etc., in wartime.  
They also make extensions to include uncertain arc capacities and other realistic 
situations such as unsuccessful interdiction attempts.  
Israeli and Wood [2002] study interdiction of an adversary’s shortest path by 
using limited resources.  Interdiction of an arc destroys an arc or increases its effective 
length (e.g., the cost of using this arc).  In our problem, cost of using an arc is the natural 
logarithm of probability of capture that the infiltrator is subject to, if he decides to use 
that arc.  An interdiction activity by USBP simply increases the probability of capture on 
some particular arcs.  
Washburn and Wood [1995] describe a two-person zero-sum game for network 
interdiction.  They consider a problem where a single evader seeks to move from a 
specified source to a specified destination while an interdictor tries to detect the evader 
by setting up an inspection point on one of the arcs.  Each arc has a known probability of 
detection if the infiltrator decides to use that arc while the interdictor has his inspection 
point there.  Their problem also has applications to interdicting drugs and illegal 
chemicals, and they solve cases with multiple interdictors, multiple evaders, and 
unknown sources and destinations.  The evader seeks to minimize the detection 
probability, while the interdictor seeks to maximize this probability.  The distinguishing 
feature of their study is that they provide a “path selection” strategy for the evader and an 
“arc-inspection” strategy for the interdictor.  Their study best addresses a case in which 
the interdictor and the evader play this game over and over.  
10 
11 
Morton, Pan, and Charlton [2003] develop a stochastic program for interdicting 
smuggled nuclear material.  The optimization is stochastic because neither the source nor 
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II. FORMULATION AND SCENARIO APPLICATION 
We express our border security problem as a two-sided optimization model.  The 
infiltrator aims to avoid getting caught while traveling from the southern side of the 
border (s) to north of the area of responsibility of USBP stations in the region (t).  We 
don’t allow the case where the infiltrator might consider traveling to the eastern or 
western side of the area of interest.  There are two infiltration types.  An infiltration may 
be on foot or in a vehicle.  We solve these separately. 
The interdictor (USBP), who can see the alternate paths that an infiltrator might 
choose, allocates limited defensive resources in anticipation of infiltration.  The 
infiltrator, who can see the interdictor’s preparations, seeks a minimum-risk path around 
or through the defenses to evade capture.  Both opponents view the probability of capture 
as the objective, which the interdictor wants to maximize, and the infiltrator wants to 
minimize.  The distinguishing feature of the models we introduce is the formal inclusion 
of transparency of USBP’s assets.  The best application of these models, for defender 
and/or infiltrator, is to prepare for a signal infiltration --- e.g., a one-time smuggling of a 
weapon of mass destruction.  The defenses and infiltration suggested can be at once the 
best case and the worst case for either party.  If either party follows the optimal plan, this 
is the best that can be done, and if either party follows some other plan, the opponent is 
better off.  
A. MODEL TERMINOLOGY 
1. Network Representation 
Each of the two stations in Yuma Sector’s Arizona region has its own area of 
responsibility (AOR).  These two areas of responsibility are combined for simplicity and 
treated as a single AOR.  
The road network of the sample area is superimposed on a satellite image.  We 
neglect parts of the network in the urban area for simplicity.  The road segments that we 
neglect include those other than major connectors, highway portions, and major local 
roads.  The road network for the non-urban areas is kept as is.  Road intersections and 
land parcels between road segments are nodes (n) of the network (alias i, j).  
Each road segment is treated as an arc that USBP can observe to increase the 
overall probability of capture (Pc).  
Each road segment connecting two nodes i and j is represented as arc (i, j).  We 
define Pd on a given arc as the probability of detection when that particular arc is 
traversed by the infiltrator.  Each arc may be a highway, major connecter, local road, or a 
trail, and this influences the probability of detection (Pd) on that arc.  
Each arc has a length (in miles), and a transition time (in hours) associated with it. 
Transition time on each arc is determined by the arc type and the intrusion type. 
The terrain is divided into homogeneous parcels, and each parcel is treated as a 
node, so we can allow traveling off the roads, and between a road segment and a land 
parcel (Figures 6 and 7).  
 
 
Figure 6.   A Sample Land Parcel 
The black arcs mark the boundaries of the sample land parcel.  White ovals indicate road 
intersections.  The black squares with white ovals in them represent centers of land 
parcels.  The gray arcs are artificial arcs from the center of the land parcel to road 
intersections. 
 
2. Infiltrator’s Courses of Action 
14 
The infiltrator decides which arcs to traverse.  We allow human infiltrators to 
traverse on the terrain and road segments, while we restrict vehicle infiltrators to road 
segments only. 
 
Figure 7.   Road Network in Yuma, Arizona 
Black ovals indicate road intersections, and the gray ovals indicate centers of land 
parcels.  The triangle represents the source, s.  The rectangle represents the destination, t. 
We assume that the infiltrator is no longer subject to capture once he reaches t.  The arcs 
that emanate from s represent the possible entry ways, and the arcs that connect to t 
represent possible exit ways.  The land parcels are not connected to road intersections in 
the figure for clarity. 
15 
3. USBP’s Courses of Actions  
USBP employs available defensive actions (a) to interdict the infiltrator’s 
unauthorized entry to U.S. soil.  A defensive action might either be a “detection” action 
(d) or a “capture” action (c).  A detection action can only lead to detection, whereas a 
capture action can lead to detection and capture of an infiltrator (Figure 8).  
A detection action or a capture action simply increases the probability of detection 
on a given set of arcs.  We assume that the expected cost resulting from employing a 
defensive action (Pd) is known by both the infiltrator and the interdictor.  
There are detection methods that a defensive action can employ (heli-patrol, road 
patrol, off-road operation, check point, remote observation post, and sensors).  Each 
defensive action employs a specific detection method (Figure 9).  The Pd on a given arc is 
determined by the physical features of that arc, and the detection method that is employed 
by that particular defensive action.  
Remote observation posts, check points and road patrols are employed by capture 
actions.  Sensors and heli-patrol detection methods are employed by detection actions.  
 
 
Figure 8.   Illustration of a Defensive Action 
A defensive action is associated with two elements: a set of arcs that can be influenced by 
this action, and a detection method that it employs.  As an example, a defensive action 
could be observing a particular portion of the AOR (e.g., a set of arcs) from air (e.g., a 
detection method).  Black lines indicate arcs that are influenced by such a defensive 
action.  Probability of detection on one of these arcs is determined by the physical 




Figure 9.   Two Separate Defensive Actions on the Same Arc, with Different 
Detection Methods 
In this example, there are two different defensive actions that can influence the Pd on the 
same arc (each of them is displayed on a separate picture of the same area).  The picture 
on the left illustrates an arc defended by a defensive action that employs a check point 
(the gray arc).  The picture on the right illustrates the situation where the same arc is 
defended by a separate defensive action that employs a road patrol (the black arc).  The 
probability of detection on that arc is determined assuming independence between these 
separate defensive actions.  The detection method that a defensive action can employ is 
pre-determined, as well as the arcs that can be influenced by that defensive action. 
We divide the AOR into grids, each of which represents a locality where a set of 




Figure 10.   Illustration of a Locality 
The gray arc illustrates a capture action that employs a check point as a detection method.  
The dashed-line rectangle indicates the locality of that particular catch option.  A locality 
might have more than one capture action.  We define that locality as the locality of 
capture action c. 
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The USBP decides which capture actions to employ (Xc) and which detection 
actions to employ with the support of a capture action from one of the neighboring 
localities (Rdl). 
When detection is made by a detection action, a capture action from the closest 
locality is informed of the detection.  A random search then starts to find the infiltrator 
around the neighborhood of the detection (i.e., any capture action from the closest 
locality carries out the search).  The probability of capture given detection occurs is a 
function of the distance between the locality of the catch action that carries out the 




Figure 11.   Support of a Detection Action with a Capture Action from a Locality. 
This example illustrates the idea of supporting a detection action with a capture action 
from a locality.  The black arcs indicate catch actions, and the gray arc indicates a 
detection action.  Two black rectangles mark two localities.  If detection occurs on the 
gray arc, the detection action that makes the detection has no capability to catch the 
infiltrator (detection actions can only lead to detection).  There are two catch actions 
employed in locality 1, and one catch action employed in locality 2.  Once the detection 
occurs on the gray arc, any catch action from the closest locality to that arc (here, locality 
1) is informed of that detection and a random search starts around where the detection 
occurs.  In reality, an intelligent search would be carried out in the presence of such 
detection; hence, these random search probabilities of capture provide a worst case 
scenario.  If detection is made by one of the capture options in, for instance, locality 1, 
then the action itself can lead to detection and capture. Hence, it is not supported with any 





This model set-up favors a capture action versus a detection action (i.e., if a 
detection action is not supported by a capture option, it is useless).  
Let PCijl be Pr {capture of an infiltrator traversing arc (i,j) by any capture action 
from locality l given detection occurs on arc (i,j)}.  We use random search theory of an 
expanding area to evaluate PCijl [Wagner, Mylander, Sanders 1999]. 
2
0 0
1 exp                 (p1)
( )ijl
wv tPC
u t t tπ
⎛ ⎞= − −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
. 
In (p1), w is the sweep-width of the searcher, v is the speed of the searcher, and u 
is the speed of the infiltrator.  While t is search time, t0 denotes the response time, which 
is the time interval between when the capture action is informed of the detection and 
when he arrives where the detection occurs.  We find shortest transition times from each 
locality to every single arc in the network (optimum response times (t) between each arc 
and each locality). Let PCijal be the probability of capture by any capture action from 
locality l, if the infiltrators is detected by defensive action a while traversing arc (i,j).  
PCijal = PCijl X Pr {detection is made by defensive action a on arc (i,j)} 
As an example, if the probability of detection on “arc (n1,n2)” by defensive action 
“a1” is 0.2, and the probability of capture by a capture action from locality “l1” given that 
detection occurs on “arc (n1,n2)” is 0.3, then “PC (n1,n2,a1,l1)”=0.2*0.3=0.06. 
B. DETERMINING PROBABILITY OF DETECTION BY DIFFERENT 
DETECTION METHODS  
Pd depends upon which detection method makes the detection, and where the 
detection is made.  Details of effects of arc type, arc length, transition time, and other 
factors on Pd differ by detection method.  
1. Pd by Road Patrol 
We define a road patrol as an 8-hour patrol by a vehicle on the ground.  Given a 
detection opportunity, we assume that the probability of detecting an infiltrator on a given 
road segment is equal to the proportion of the patrol time over that road segment to the 
total patrol time (8 hours).  If the road patrol vehicle and the infiltrator are on the same 
road segment at any time, a detection opportunity is assumed to occur. 
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2. Pd by Heli-Patrol 
We identify separate candidate regions in the AOR in which USBP can employ 
heli-patrol.  We limit heli-patrol method to deserts, plains, and valleys.  Pd by heli-patrol 
is a function of the area that the search is carried out (A), speed of the aircraft (v), amount 
of time the searched object remains in the search area together with the searcher (t), and 
sweep width of the aircraft (w).  Search time t is determined by the transition times on 
those particular arcs that the infiltrator decides to traverse.  We assume a helicopter speed 
of 120 knots, an altitude of 500 feet, a visibility condition of 10 nautical miles, and an 
environment with a 15-60 percent level vegetation or hilly terrain.  We extract sweep 
width values using Tables 2 and 3. 
An aircraft under the assumptions we make has w=0.5 nautical miles when the 
searched object is a person, and 1.3 nm for a vehicle.  We multiply those values with 
correction factors of 0.5 and 0.7 according to the assumptions we make, and we get the 
corrected (actual) w values of 0.25 and 0.91, respectively.  Let c denote the constant 
value wv/A.  Pd for a random search in a given search area (As), is given by equation (p2) 
[Wagner, Mylander, Sanders, 1999, p. 174]. 
( )
    .                 (p2)1
ct
dP e
−= −  
Search 
Object
Height(m(ft)) 6(3) 9(5) 19(10) 28(15) 37(20)
150(500) 0.7(0.4) 0.7(0.4) 0.9(0.5) 0.9(0.5) 0.9(0.5)
300(1000) 0.7(0.4) 0.7(0.4) 0.9(0.5) 0.9(0.5) 0.9(0.5)
450(1500) - - - - -
600(2000) - - - - -
150(500) 1.7(0.9) 2.4(1.3) 2.4(1.3) 2.4(1.3) 2.4(1.3)
300(1000) 1.9(1.0) 2.6(1.4) 2.6(1.4) 2.8(1.5) 2.8(1.5)
450(1500) 1.9(1.0) 2.6(1.4) 3.1(1.7) 3.1(1.7) 3.1(1.7)
600(2000) 1.9(1.0) 2.8(1.5) 3.7(2.0) 3.7(2.0) 3.7(2.0)
150(500) 1.9(1.0) 2.6(1.4) 2.6(1.4) 2.6(1.4) 2.6(1.4)
300(1000) 1.9(1.0) 2.8(1.5) 2.8(1.5) 3.0(1.6) 3.0(1.6)
450(1500) 1.9(1.0) 2.8(1.5) 3.3(1.8) 3.3(1.8) 3.3(1.8)








Table 2. Sweep Widths for Visual Land Search  
For example, 0.7(0.4) is the sweep width for an aircraft at an altitude of 150 meters (i.e., 
500 feet), when the visibility is 6 kilometers (3 nautical miles) [International Maritime 







or Mountainous Over 85% Vegetation 
Person 0.5 0.3 0.1 
Vehicle 0.7 0.4 1.1 
Aircraft less 
than 5700 kg 0.7 0.4 2.1 
Aircraft over 
5700 kg 0.8 0.4 3.1 
Table 3. Correction Factors- Vegetation and High Terrain  
For example, sweep width value needs to be multiplied by 0.5 if a searched object is a 
person and the terrain has 15-60 percent vegetation or it is hilly [IMO, ICAO, 1999]. 
 
This formula assumes a continuous search time (t) in a given search area. 
However, we define Pd values being associated with arcs.  Let denote the individual 
non-detection probability at the time that the infiltrator traverses nth arc in As, and  
denote the detection probability.  We assume that a total number of n arcs will be 
traversed during the search.  Let denote the total probability of no detection at the end 
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Let tn be the transition time on the nth arc. 
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Thus, non-detection probability for a given candidate heli-patrol area in [0, t] can 
be partitioned into a series of independent non-detection probabilities on each arc based 
on the transition time on that individual arc. 
3. Pd by off-Road Operations 
Pd for off-road operations is determined by the use of random search theory, this 
time v being 10 miles per hour and w=400 feet.  
4. Pd by Check Points 
We assume that Pd by a check point is 0.15. 
5. Pd by Remote Observation Posts 
A remote observation post operates like a check point.  We assume that Pd by a 
remote observation post is 0.4, to reflect the higher proportions of people or vehicles that 
can be stopped at those points due to lighter traffic.  
6. Pd by Sensors 
We assume that Pd by a sensor is 0.4 for a vehicle and 0.2 for a human. 
C. MATHEMATICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TWO-SIDED 
DETECTION AND CAPTURE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM  
The following optimization models express the opposing goals of an interdictor, 
and an infiltrator.  
1. Indices and Index Sets 
n N∈  node, representing a road intersection or an area parcel in the 
Area of Responsibility (AOR), (alias i,j) 
s N∈  source node, origin of any infiltration path 
t N∈  destination node of any infiltration path 
( , )i j A∈  a directed arc (adjacency) from node i to node j in D-graph A. 
a Q∈  defensive action 
( )c a C Q∈ ⊆  a defensive “capture” action that can lead to detection and 
capture of an infiltrator 
( )d a D Q∈ ⊆  a defensive “detection” action that can lead to detection of an 
infiltrator, and that can only lead to capture in conjunction with 
a supporting capture action ( ) ,C D Q C D∨ = ∧ = ∅
l L∈  locality, or area where a defensive action can be employed 
cl  locality of capture action c 
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g G∈  type of resource restriction on defensive actions (e.g., 
helicopters, patrol vehicles, personnel, etc.) 
2. Data 
ijr  intrinsic risk of detection and capture if an infiltrator traverses 
arc (i,j), regardless of any USBP action. 
ijalPC  if an infiltrator traverses arc (i,j) and the detection is made by 
defensive action a, the probability that a catch action from 
locality l will lead to capture. A capture action c(a) is based in 
lc, while a detection action d(a) is supported with a capture 
action from one of a number of localities. 
ln(1 )ijal ijallnPNC PC≡ − . 
acost  cost of employing defensive action a  
max_cost               maximum budget for the cost of all defensive actions 
,a gresource  defensive action a consumption of resource type g  
gavailability  maximum resource type g available for all defensive actions 
 
3. Decision Variables 
{0,1}dlR ∈  binary decision to employ detection action d with support of a 
capture option from locality l 
{0,1}cX ∈  binary decision to employ capture option c in locality lc  
{0,1}ijY ∈  binary decision by the infiltrator to traverse arc (i,j) on a path 
from source node s to destination node t  
4. Minimax Optimization of Probability of Non-Catch [Dual Variables] 
( )
( , ) ,
s
n, ( , ) ( , )
t
max (1 ) (1 ) 1 (i0)     
1 for source, (i1) [W ]
min 0   { , } (i2) [W ]
1 for destination, (i3) [W ]
0        ( , )
ij ijdl dl c ijY i j A d l c
nj inX R n j A i n A
ij
cijclr PC R PC X Y
n s
Y Y n s t
n t
Y i j A
∈
∈ ∈
⎛ ⎞− − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
+ =⎧⎪− = ∀ −∑ ∑ ⎨⎪− =⎩
≥ ∀ ∈
∏ ∏ ∏
(i4)      
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 
The objective function (i0) expresses the probability that the infiltrator will evade 
capture while traversing his chosen path from node s to node t. Each arc (i,j) is vulnerable 
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to detection and capture by parties other than USBP, and to a number of USBP detection 
actions R and capture actions X. Each capture probability PC conveys whether or not its 
detection or capture action can influence the outcome: for any arc (i,j), detection action dl 
or capture action c will offer a capture probability PC sufficiently large to signal a 
reasonable alternative, or not. Constraints (i1-i3) enforce conservation of flow along an 
infiltrator path: the infiltrator must depart from node s (i1), must depart any intermediate 
node he enters (i2), and must arrive at node t (i3).  The non-negativity restrictions (i4) 
actually suffice, for any fixed R and X, to render binary values for Y. 
The above minimax formulation makes the implicit assumption that the infiltrator 
moves last; that is, the infiltrator chooses the path in the knowledge of all 
countermeasures already employed by USBP. We define that as the transparency of 
USBP’s assets.  This “transparency” assumption is pessimistic from the view point of 
USBP. 
Objective function (i0) is non-linear in Y, X and R.  However, exploiting the fact 
that maximizing the logarithm of a function maximizes the function, we can reformulate 
as follows: 
(i0) is equivalent to: 
)
( , ) ,
max   ln (1 ) (1 ) (1                    (i5)ij ijdl dl c ijY i j A d l c cijcl
r PC R PC X Y
∈
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠∏ ∏ ∏
( ) ( )
( , ) ,
max ln(1 ) ln 1 ln 1 .    (i6)ij ijdl dl c ijY arc i j A d l c cijcl
r PC R PC X Y
∈
⎛ ⎞= − + − + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ ∑  
Because X, R and Y are binary, (i6) is equivalent to: 
( ) ( )
( , ) ,
max ln(1 ) ln 1 ln 1  .  (i7)ij ijdl dl c ijY arc i j A d l c cijcl
r PC R PC X Y
∈
⎛ ⎞− + − + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ ∑  
Substituting  for lnijallnPNC (1 )ijalPC− , the revised objective function becomes: 
( , ) ,
max ln(1 )  .  (i8)
cij ijdl dl ijcl c ijY arc i j A d l c
r lnPNC R lnPNC X Y
∈
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Constraint (u1) limits the cost of employing detection and capture actions. Each 
constraint (u2) limits a resource consumed by detection and capture actions. Each 
constraint (u3) assures that a detection action d is supported by some capture action from 
locality lc. Each constraint (u4) limits each detection action to be supported with a capture 
action from at most one locality. Note that a capture action can be committed to any 
number of defensive actions d. (u5) and (u6) require binary decisions. 
6. Two Sided Mixed Integer Optimization Model to Minimize Maximum 
Achievable Probability of Escape   
For a fixed set of defense decisions, X* and R*; the infiltrator’s problem is a 
linear program that will render an intrinsically integer optimum infiltration solution Y*. 
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∀ ∈  
We can then recover an infiltrator’s optimal infiltration plan by solving the above 
problem, and then substituting X*, and R* into the original maximization problem to 
obtain Y.  
D. A SAMPLE YUMA, ARIZONA SCENARIO  
We identify five candidate heli-patrol, and three road patrol areas.  We limit 
check-points to highways and urban areas, and remote observation posts to remote areas 
close to the border.  We do not allow heli-patrol and road patrol on highways and urban 
areas.  The only arcs with sensors are the ones at the entry points along the border.  There 
are 522 candidate defensive actions, 344 nodes representing road intersections and land 
parcels (26 land parcels), 1200 arcs, and six defensive options available.  We use 
availability constraints only (e.g., availability of “helicopters” is no more than two), and 
use a commercial map to identify road types, length, and geographical features.  We then 
determine the probability of detection on each arc given a defensive action and multiply 
that value by the probability of capture value that we obtain by using shortest path 
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distances from each arc to each locality.  We identify 57 such localities, and solve the 
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III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
We evaluate various strategies that USBP can apply.  One strategy might differ 
from another in the way the candidate defensive actions are chosen, or number of 
available assets that can be used, etc.  (Note that USBP can apply two different types of 
defensive actions, and we can evaluate the contribution of both individually or in concert 
with each other.)  
A. SCENARIO A: A SURPRISE VEHICLE INFILTRATION 
If USBP commits no assets to secure the border, the infiltrator will choose the 
minimum-risk path based on the intrinsic risk of each arc (e.g., the probability that a local 
resident will call USBP to report people trespassing).  We define this as a surprise 
infiltration.  The minimum-risk infiltration is shown Figure 12.   
B. SCENARIO B: OPTIMAL USBP ASSET ALLOCATION AGAINST A 
SURPRISE VEHICLE INFILTRATION 
Assuming the infiltrator can’t observe USBP’s pre-positioning of its assets, but 
that USBP actually has perfect intelligence of where the surprise intrusion will occur, we 
can optimize USBP’s asset allocation accordingly.  Figure 13 illustrates the optimal 
defensive plan to interdict such an intrusion.  The infiltrator still achieves a probability of 
escape of 0.4, even when he chooses a path in the mistaken belief USBP has no 
interdiction assets. 
C. SCENARIOS C AND D: A VEHICLE INFILTRATION AND 
INTERDICTION PLAN ASSUMING TRANSPARENCY OF USBP’S 
ASSETS 
If the infiltrator knows USBP preparations in advance, he will seek to minimize 
his probability of capture by selecting an optimal evasive infiltration plan.  The infiltrator 
anticipates a certain probability of getting caught --- the risk of the path he chooses.  
From USBP’s perspective, the problem is to decide which defensive actions to employ 
such that the maximum probability of escape the infiltrator can achieve is minimized.  
The USBP also anticipates a certain probability of the infiltrator getting through.  If the 
infiltrator chooses a path other than the anticipated optimal path, then the USBP is better 
off.  If the USBP prepositions its assets in a way different from the anticipated optimal 
interdiction plan, the infiltrator has even more chance of escape.  
  
Figure 12.   Scenario A: A Surprise Vehicle Infiltration through Downtown Yuma 
White ovals are road intersections, and black rectangles with white ovals on them are 
centers of land parcels.  Black ovals are the nodes on the infiltrator’s path.  Dashed lines 
represent artificial arcs that are entry and exit ways into AOR. The USBP employs no 
assets to interdict this infiltration.  The probability of capture is based on the exposure 
time of the infiltrator in AOR.  This is a surprise intrusion that minimizes the infiltrator’s 





Figure 13.   Scenario B: A Surprise Interdiction of a Vehicle Infiltration 
White ovals are road intersections, black rectangles with white ovals on them are centers 
of land parcels, and the black ovals are the nodes on the infiltrator’s path.  The gray arc is 
defended by a sensor.  The black arcs are defended by checkpoints.  Note that the sensor 
is backed up by a check point.  If detection is made by that sensor, personnel from the 
near-by check point capture the infiltrator.  In our model, the USBP has very limited 
assets to use in urban areas (e.g., we assume that road patrol and heli-patrol are not 
efficient in an urban area).  The infiltrator gets a high return in the urban area because of 
these limitations (i.e., the probability of escape is as high as 0.4 even under the mistaken 




In Scenario C, the USBP can employ one check point, one remote observation 
post, two road patrols, sensors to cover at most 15 road segments, and one helicopter.  
The solution from this two-sided model is shown in Figures 14 and 15.  The infiltrator 
escapes with a probability of 0.93.  This intrusion takes place in downtown Yuma.  
Downtown Yuma offers a cheap intrusion in terms of probability of capture, because the 
USBP has limited assets there.  The only effective means of detection and capture in 
downtown Yuma is the use of check points.  With one visible check point, the interdictor 
can circumnavigate, and USBP can’t make the necessary cut to divert the intrusion from 
downtown Yuma to the desert. 
In Scenario D, the USBP can employ two check points, two remote observation 
posts, two road patrols, sensors to cover at most 15 road segments, and one helicopter.  A 
solution is shown in Figures 15 and 16.  The infiltrator escapes with a probability of 0.89.  
The probability of escape is high in these cases because of the assumption of 
transparency of USBP’s assets.  Each time the infiltrator sees a check-point he can go 





Figure 14.   Scenario C: A Vehicle Infiltration through Downtown Yuma 
(Transparency of USBP’s assets) 
White ovals are road intersections, black rectangles are centers of land parcels, and the 
black ovals are the nodes on the infiltrator’s optimal path.  The gray arcs are defended by 
detection actions, and the black arcs are defended by capture actions.  Check points and 
remote observation posts are marked by a dashed-line ellipse.  Details of where different 
actions interact are not shown for clarity.  Each detection action is supported with a 
capture action.  The USBP allocates one check point, one remote observation post, two 
road patrols, sensors to cover at most 15 road segments, and one helicopter.  (Our 
solution provides capture actions close enough to detection options to increase the 
probability of capture.)  The probability of capture is 0.08. This is the best the USBP can 
do if the infiltrator can anticipate all defensive actions.  Focus on the allocation of assets 
rather than the probability of capture.  
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Figure 15.   Relationship between a Capture Action and a Detection Action in Our 
Solution 
This is a blown-up view of the checkpoint in downtown Yuma.  The white ovals are the 
road intersections, black rectangles with white ovals on them are centers of land parcels, 
and the black ovals are the nodes on the infiltrator’s path.  The gray arcs are defended by 
detection options.  The black arc is defended by a check point.  If detection occurs on any 
of these gray arcs, the capture action (a check point in this case) carries out the search to 
lead to capture of the infiltrator. 
D. SCENARIO E: OPTIMAL INTERDICTION PLAN AGAINST 
INFILTRATION ON FOOT 
We solve a sample problem where the USBP can employ one check point, one 
remote observation post, two road patrols, sensors to cover at most 15 road segments, one 
helicopter and one off-road operation.  We adjust infiltrator transition times and arcs to 
represent travel on foot.  A solution is shown in Figure 18. 
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Figure 16.   Scenario D: Transparency of USBP’s assets (diverting the vehicle 
infiltration from downtown Yuma to the desert) 
White ovals are road intersections, black rectangles are centers of land parcels, and the 
black ovals are the nodes on the infiltrator’s optimum path.  The gray arcs are defended 
by detection actions, and the black arcs are defended by capture actions.  Check points 
and remote observation posts are marked by a dashed-line ellipse.  Details of where 
different actions interact are not shown for clarity.  The USBP allocates two check points, 
two observation posts, two road patrols, sensors to cover at most 15 road segments, and 
one helicopter.  The probability of capture increases to 0.11 from 0.08.  More 
importantly, the infiltration is diverted from downtown Yuma to the desert. 
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Figure 17.   Check-Points Identifying The Critical Arcs which, Once Defended, Will 
Make the Intrusion through Downtown Yuma More Expensive than the Desert 
The white ovals are the road intersections, black rectangles with white ovals on them are 






















Figure 18.   Scenario E: An Optimal Plan to Interdict an Intruder on Foot 
(Transparency of USBP’s assets) 
White ovals are the road intersections, black rectangles with white ovals on them are 
centers of land parcels, and the black ovals and black rectangles are the nodes on the 
infiltrator’s optimal path.  Black rectangles are centers of land parcels that the infiltrator 
traverses.  The infiltrator on foot accepts a certain initial risk at the time of entry into the 
U.S., and thereafter plans to exploit terrain, and avoid detection or capture.  The 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
We have introduced a mixed integer linear program that expresses a border 
security problem mathematically.  We study two different cases, one a vehicle intruder, 
and one an intruder on foot, where the infiltrator can see the USBP’s preparations and 
where he can’t.  We evaluate different strategies and USBP’s use of different resources to 
interdict an unauthorized entry into the U.S.  Our implementation best addresses a well-
planned, signal infiltration --e.g., a one-time smuggling of a weapon of mass destruction.  
We use probability of capture as the measure of effectiveness.  We make a 
distinction between actions that can only lead to detection and actions that can also lead 
to capture in addition to detection.  This distinguishing feature reflects the interaction 
between different types of defensive actions.  Our model provides insight for border 
security planners by identifying critical road segments, areas and land parcels to be 
defended to preclude evasion of visible interdiction actions, and effects of employing 
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